Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection

Douglas Gale ()

A chapter in Differential Information Economies, 2005, pp 441-463 from Springer

Abstract: Summary The paper analyzes an economy with two-sided adverse selection, focusing on equilibria that satisfy a refinement based on the notion of strategic stability. In the familiar case of one-sided adverse selection, agents reveal all of their private information as long as the contract space is rich enough. However, with twosided adverse selection, the sufficient conditions for separation are much stronger.

Keywords: Signaling; Adverse selection; Markets; Rationing; Types; Equilibrium; Refinement; Strategic stability; Walrasian (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-26979-3_23

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-26979-7_23

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