Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the core

Frank H. Page
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Frank H. Page: University of Alabama

A chapter in Differential Information Economies, 2005, pp 125-134 from Springer

Abstract: Summary We provide an alternative proof of the existence of core allocations in exchange economies with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces. We also identify a critical feature of information sharing rules that ensures nonemptiness of the core. In essence, the only condition we require on the sharing rules is that profitable “insider trading” be prohibited. In the absence of insider trading, balancedness is guaranteed and core nonemptiness follows.

Keywords: Banach Lattice; Grand Coalition; Inside Trading; Coalition Member; Market Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-26979-3_7

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-26979-7_7

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