Probabilistic Choice and Optimal Contracts

Suren Basov

Chapter Chapter 5 in Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts, 2016, pp 69-106 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter I study optimal contracts in the context of probabilistic choice models. Probabilistic choice models represent a more drastic deviation from the standard paradigm since agents in these type of models no longer follow maximizing behavior.

Keywords: High Type; Bounded Rationality; Optimal Contract; Rational Consumer; Information Rent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:steccp:978-981-10-1041-5_5

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9789811010415

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5_5

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Studies in Economic Theory from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().