Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts

Suren Basov

in Studies in Economic Theory from Springer, currently edited by Nicholas C. Yannelis, Timothy J. Kehoe and Bernard Cornet

Date: 2016
ISBN: 978-981-10-1041-5
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Chapters in this book:

Ch Chapter 1 Introduction

Suren Basov

Ch Chapter 2 Ambiguity, Robustness, and Contract Design

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Ch Chapter 3 Evolution of Preferences, Social Norms, and Decision Rules

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Ch Chapter 4 Complexity Constraints and Optimal Contracts

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Ch Chapter 5 Probabilistic Choice and Optimal Contracts

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Ch Chapter 6 Bounded Rationality, Learning, and Optimal Contracts

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Ch Chapter 7 Social Norms and Optimal Contracts

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Ch Chapter 8 Miscellaneous Models

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Ch Chapter 9 Conclusions and Directions for Further Research

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stecth:978-981-10-1041-5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5

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