Social Norms and Optimal Contracts

Suren Basov

Chapter Chapter 7 in Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts, 2016, pp 119-146 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter I will consider interaction of social norms and economic incentives. Adherence to social norms can itself be considered as a form of bounded rationality, since they provide an agent with a simple instruction how to behave.

Keywords: Social Norm; Incentive Contract; Moral Hazard Problem; Gift Exchange; Islamic Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5_7

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