Election by Majority Judgment: Experimental Evidence

Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki

Chapter Chapter 2 in In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform, 2011, pp 13-54 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The majority judgement is a method of election. It is the consequence of a new theory of social choice where voters judge candidates instead of ranking them. The theory is developed elsewhere (Balinski and Laraki 2007, 2010). This article describes and analyzes electoral experiments conducted in parallel with the last two French presidential elections to: (1) show that the majority judgement is a practical method, (2) describe it and establish its salient properties, and (3) illustrate how in practice the well known electoral mechanisms all fail to meet important criteria.

Keywords: Presidential Election; Common Language; Interval Measure; Strategic Vote; Approval Vote (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Working Paper: Election by Majority Judgement: Experimental Evidence (2007)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-7539-3_2

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