Comparison of Voting Procedures Using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy
Damien Bol (),
Arnaud Dellis () and
Mandar Oak ()
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Damien Bol: King’s College London
A chapter in The Political Economy of Social Choices, 2016, pp 21-54 from Springer
Abstract This article surveys the latest advances in the literature on the comparative properties of different voting procedures in the context of political elections. In particular, we focus on the various attempts at understanding how different voting procedures affect the number of candidates and the positions they adopt. In public debate as well as academic scholarship, the comparative properties of different voting procedures has been a topic of enduring interest. This interest dates as far back as the late eighteenth century French philosopher-mathematicians Condorcet and Borda (and even earlier with the works of Lull and Cusanus), building up to the classic works of Arrow, May and Gibbard-Satthertwaite in the mid-twentieth century. The work in this tradition is largely confined to a rather abstract treatment of voting procedures, over an exogenously given set of alternatives.
Keywords: Candidates; Duverger’s hypothesis; Duverger’s law; Polarization; Voting rules; C72; D72; H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy (2016)
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