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Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy

Damien Bol (), Arnaud Dellis () and Mandar Oak ()
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Damien Bol: King's College, London

No 2016-02, School of Economics Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics

Abstract: We survey the literature that compares the theoretical properties of different voting procedures using models of electoral competition with endogenous candidacy. In particular, we focus on the predictions made by these models regarding the number of candidates running for election and their polarization. We organize the different models into three families based on different assumptions regarding candidate motivation and the timing of candidate entry. We argue that endogenous candidacy models offer both theoretical and empirical advantages over the standard Hotelling-Downs model in the comparison of the properties of alternative voting procedures. On the theoretical front, these models can provide a more satisfactory microfoundation for the emergence and/or stability of a specific configuration of parties or candidates under different voting procedures. On the empirical front these models offer a better account of the stylized facts about elections, particularly when it comes to explaining the cases where Duverger's propositions apply and the cases where they do not. We also point to shortcomings of these models and propose some directions for future research.

Keywords: Voting rules; Candidates; Polarization; Duverger's law; Duverger's hypothesis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
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Chapter: Comparison of Voting Procedures Using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy (2016)
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