Seniority in Legislature

Richard D. McKelvey and Raymond Riezman
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Richard D. McKelvey: California Institute of Technology, USA

Chapter 12 in International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, 2013, pp 185-199 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractWe construct a stochastic model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system. We model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents as an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game. The game has a stationary equilibrium with the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non-trivial seniority system, and that incumbent legislators are always reelected.

Keywords: International Trade; Political Economy; Theory of International Free Trade Agreements; Customs Unions; Tariff Dynamics; Storable Votes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Related works:
Journal Article: Seniority in Legislatures (1992)
Working Paper: Seniority in Legislatures (1990)
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