Seniority in Legislatures

Richard D. McKelvey and Raymond Riezman

American Political Science Review, 1992, vol. 86, issue 4, 951-965

Abstract: We construct a stochastic model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system. We model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents as an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game. The game has a stationary equilibrium with the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non-trivial seniority system, and that incumbent legislators are always reelected.

Date: 1992
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Chapter: Seniority in Legislature (2013)
Working Paper: Seniority in Legislatures (1990)
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