Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining

Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Kalyan Chatterjee and Tomas Sjostrom
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Kalyan Chatterjee: Department of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University, USA

Chapter 7 in Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market:Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, 2013, pp 129-181 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractWe study a game-theoretic model where three political parties (left, median and right) can form coalitions both before and after the election. Before the election, coalitions can commit to a seat-sharing arrangement, but not to a policy platform or a division of rents from office; coalition members are free to break up and join other coalitions after the election. Equilibrium pre-electoral coalitions are not necessarily made up of the most ideologically similar parties, and they form under proportional representation as well as plurality rule. They form not only to avoid splitting the vote, but also because seat-sharing arrangements will influence the post-election bargaining and coalition

Keywords: Bilateral Bargaining; Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining; Political Negotiations; Multilateral Bargaining; Coalitional Bargaining; Arbitration; Dynamic Model of Negotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Related works:
Journal Article: Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining (2011)
Working Paper: Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Post-Election Bargaining (2010)
Working Paper: Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining (2009)
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