Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Post-Election Bargaining

Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Kalyan Chatterjee and Tomas Sjostrom

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Abstract: We study a game-theoretic model where political parties can form coalitions both before and after the elections. Before election, coalitions can commit to a seat-sharing arrangement, but not to a policy or to a division of rents from office; coalition members are free to break up and join other coalitions after the election. Equilibrium pre-electoral coalitions are not necessarily made up of the most ideologically similar parties, and they form under proportional representation as well as plurality rule. They do so to avoid "splitting the vote", but also because seat-sharing arrangements will influence the ex post bargaining and coalition formation.

Keywords: Ex ante coalition; ex post bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 H19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2010-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
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Related works:
Chapter: Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining (2013)
Journal Article: Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining (2011)
Working Paper: Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:09-10r

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