Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach

Effrosyni Diamantoudi () and Eftichios Sartzetakis ()

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University

Abstract: In this paper we examine the formation of International Environmental Agreement (IEAs). We provide an analytical treatment of the main model used in the literature and offer a formal solution of it (which has not been available so far), while we clarify some misconceptions that exist in the literature. We find that the unique stable IEA consist of either two, three or four signatories if the number of countries is greater than or equal to 5. Furthermore, we show that the welfare of the signatories of a stable IEA is very close to its lowest level vs the welfare of signatories of other non-stable IEAs. While in our model countries' choice variable is emissions, we extend our results to the case where the choice variable is abatement efforts.

Keywords: International Environmental Agreements; Coalition Formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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https://repec.econ.au.dk/repec/afn/wp/01/wp01_10.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach (2006)
Working Paper: Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach (2003)
Working Paper: Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aah:aarhec:2001-10

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