Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach

Effrosyni Diamantoudi () and Eftichios Sartzetakis ()

No 4001, Working Papers from Concordia University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we examine the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We show that the welfare of the signatories does not increase monotonically with respect to the number of signatories. We provide an analytical solution of the leadership model. In particular, we find that the unique stable IEA consist of either two, three or four signatories if the number of countries is greater than 4. Furthermore, we show that the welfare of the signatories is almost at its lowest level when the IEA is stable. While in our where the choice variable is abatement efforts.

Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2001-10, Revised 2003-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach (2006)
Working Paper: Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach (2002)
Working Paper: Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crd:wpaper:04001

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