Centralized Allocation in Multiple Markets

Daniel Monte () and Norovsambuu Tumennasan ()

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University

Abstract: The problem of allocating indivisible objects to different agents, where each individual is assigned at most one object, has been widely studied. Pápai (2000) shows that the set of strategy-proof, nonbossy, Pareto optimal and reallocation-proof rules are hierarchical exchange rules | generalizations of Gale's Top Trading Cycles mechanism. We study the centralized allocation that takes place in multiple markets. For example, the assignment of multiple types of indivisible objects; or the assignment of objects in successive periods. We show that the set of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient and nonbossy rules are sequential dictatorships, a special case of Pápai's hierarchical exchange rules.

Keywords: Matching; Strategy-Proofness; Nonbossiness; Pareto efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2012-05-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Centralized allocation in multiple markets (2015)
Working Paper: Centralized allocation in multiple markets (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aah:aarhec:2012-09

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