Centralized Allocation in Multiple Markets
Daniel Monte () and
Norovsambuu Tumennasan ()
Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University
The problem of allocating indivisible objects to different agents, where each individual is assigned at most one object, has been widely studied. Pápai (2000) shows that the set of strategy-proof, nonbossy, Pareto optimal and reallocation-proof rules are hierarchical exchange rules | generalizations of Gale's Top Trading Cycles mechanism. We study the centralized allocation that takes place in multiple markets. For example, the assignment of multiple types of indivisible objects; or the assignment of objects in successive periods. We show that the set of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient and nonbossy rules are sequential dictatorships, a special case of Pápai's hierarchical exchange rules.
Keywords: Matching; Strategy-Proofness; Nonbossiness; Pareto efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Centralized allocation in multiple markets (2015)
Working Paper: Centralized allocation in multiple markets (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aah:aarhec:2012-09
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