Centralized allocation in multiple markets

Daniel Monte () and Norovsambuu Tumennasan ()

No 322, Textos para discussão from FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil)

Abstract: We study the problem of centralized allocation of indivisible objects in multiple markets. We show that the set of allocation rules that are group strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient are sequential dictatorships. Therefore, the solution of the joint al-location in multiple markets is significantly narrower than in the single-market case. Our result also applies to dynamic allocation problems. Finally, we provide conditions under which the solution of the single-market allocation coincides with the multiple-market case, and we apply this result to the study of the school choice problem with sibling priorities.

Date: 2013-04-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/0275e188-6e4 ... 82c7340d532/download (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Centralized allocation in multiple markets (2015)
Working Paper: Centralized Allocation in Multiple Markets (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fgv:eesptd:322

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Textos para discussão from FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Núcleo de Computação da FGV EPGE ().