EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish

Ozgur Evren and Stefania Minardi ()
Additional contact information
Stefania Minardi: Department of Economics, New York University

No w0171, Working Papers from New Economic School (NES)

Abstract: Warm-glow refers to other-serving behavior that is valuable for the actor per se, apart from its social implications. We provide axiomatic foundations for warm-glow by viewing it as a form of preference for larger choice sets, in the sense of the literature on freedom of choice. Specically, an individual who experiences warm-glow prefers the freedom to be sel sh: she values the availability of sel sh options even if she plans to act unsel shly. Our theory also provides foundations for empirically distinguishing between warm-glow and other motivations for prosocial behavior. The implied choice behavior subsumes Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and Andreoni (1990).

Keywords: Altruism; Warm-Glow; Freedom of Choice; Philanthropy; Charitable Giving; Public Goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D64 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2011-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.nes.ru/files/Preprints-resh/WP171.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Warm‐glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to Be Selfish (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to Be Selfish (2013)
Working Paper: Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish (2011) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:abo:neswpt:w0171

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from New Economic School (NES) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Vladimir Ivanyukhin ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:abo:neswpt:w0171