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Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish

Ozgur Evren and Stefania Minardi

No w0171, Working Papers from Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR)

Abstract: Warm-glow refers to other-serving behavior that is valuable for the actor per se, apart from its social implications. We provide axiomatic foundations for warm-glow by viewing it as a form of preference for larger choice sets, in the sense of the literature on freedom of choice. Specically, an individual who experiences warm-glow prefers the freedom to be sel sh: she values the availability of sel sh options even if she plans to act unsel shly. Our theory also provides foundations for empirically distinguishing between warm-glow and other motivations for prosocial behavior. The implied choice behavior subsumes Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and Andreoni (1990).

Keywords: Altruism; Warm-Glow; Freedom of Choice; Philanthropy; Charitable Giving; Public Goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D64 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-mic, nep-pub and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cefir.ru/papers/WP171.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Warm‐glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to Be Selfish (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to Be Selfish (2013)
Working Paper: Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish (2011) Downloads
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