Score Disclosure

Levent Celik and Mikhail Drugov

No w0285, Working Papers from New Economic School (NES)

Abstract: We study verifiable disclosure by a monopolist when the product has multiple quality attributes. We identify an equilibrium in which the firm discloses a score- the average of the qualities-without revealing any further information. While full unraveling is still an equilibrium, it is dominated by the score equilibrium in terms of ex ante as well as ex post profits. Moreover, it is "defeated" by the score equilibrium.

Keywords: Monopoly; quality uncertainty; verifiable information disclosure; multi- dimensional types. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 L12 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2021-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des and nep-mic
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https://www.nes.ru/files/Preprints-resh/WP285.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Score Disclosure (2025)
Working Paper: Score Disclosure (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:abo:neswpt:w0285

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