Score Disclosure

Levent Celik and Mikhail Drugov

The Economic Journal, 2025, vol. 135, issue 666, 519-537

Abstract: We study verifiable disclosure by a seller when the product has multiple quality attributes. We identify an equilibrium in which, for some qualities, the seller discloses its score—the average of the qualities—and does not reveal anything else. This occurs when its score is sufficiently high or when the qualities are sufficiently similar and the score is not too low. Otherwise, the seller fully discloses. While full unravelling is still an equilibrium, it is dominated by this partial score disclosure equilibrium in terms of ex ante as well as ex post profits.

Date: 2025
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Working Paper: Score Disclosure (2021)
Working Paper: Score Disclosure (2021)
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