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Selecting the Best when Selection is Hard

Mikhail Drugov, Margaret Meyer and Marc Moeller ()
Additional contact information
Marc Moeller: University of Bern

Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Marc Möller ()

No w0290, Working Papers from New Economic School (NES)

Abstract: In dynamic promotion contests, where performance measurement is noisy and ordinal, selection can be improved by biasing later stages in favor of early leaders. Even in the worst-case scenario, where noise swamps ability differences in determining relative performance, optimal bias is i) strictly positive; ii) locally insensitive to changes in the heterogeneity-to-noise ratio. A close relationship with expected optimal bias under cardinal information helps explain this surprising result. Properties i) and ii) imply that the simple rule of setting bias as if in the worst-case scenario achieves most of the potential gains in selective efficiency from biasing dynamic rank-order contests.

Keywords: Dynamic Contests; Selective Efficiency; Bias; Learning; Promotions JEL Classifications: D21, D82, D83, M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2022-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.nes.ru/files/Preprints-resh/WP290.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Selecting the Best when Selection is Hard (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Selecting the best when selection is hard (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Selecting the Best when Selection is Hard (2022) Downloads
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