Third Down with a Yard to Go: The Dixit-Skeath Conundrum on Equilibria in Competitive Games

Simon Grant, Atsushi Kajii and B. Polak

ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics from Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics

Abstract: In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; COMPETITION; EXPECTATIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 1999-07
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Related works:
Working Paper: Third Down with a Yard to Go: The Dixit-Skeath Conundrum on Equilibria in Competitive Games (2000)
Working Paper: Third Down with a Yard to Go: The Dixit-Skeath Conundrum on Equilibria in Competitive Games (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:acb:cbeeco:1999-375

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