Third Down with a Yard to Go: The Dixit-Skeath Conundrum on Equilibria in Competitive Games

Simon Grant, Atsushi Kajii and B. Polak

Working Papers from Australian National University - Department of Economics

Abstract: In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; COMPETITION; EXPECTATIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 1999
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Working Paper: Third Down with a Yard to Go: The Dixit-Skeath Conundrum on Equilibria in Competitive Games (2000)
Working Paper: Third Down with a Yard to Go: The Dixit-Skeath Conundrum on Equilibria in Competitive Games (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aunaec:375

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