Private Provision of Public Goods between Families

Richard Cornes, Jun-ichi Itaya () and Aiko Tanaka ()

ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics from Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics

Abstract: We consider a two-stage voluntary provision model where individuals in a family contribute to a pure public good and/or a household public good, and, at the same time, the parent makes private transfers to her child within the same family. We show not only that Warr’s neutrality holds regardless of the different timings of parent-to-child transfers, but also that there is a continuum of Nash equilibria in the sense that individuals’ contributions and parental transfers are indeterminate, although the allocation of each’s private consumption and total public good provision is uniquely determined. We further show that, even in the presence of impure altruism or productivity difference in supplying public goods, neutrality and uniqueness of the equilibrium allocation may persist.

JEL-codes: C72 D64 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 Pages
Date: 2011-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp542.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Private provision of public goods between families (2012)
Working Paper: Private Provision of Public Goods between Families (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2011-542

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