Private Provision of Public Goods between Families

Richard Cornes, Jun-ichi Itaya () and Aiko Tanaka

No 194, Discussion paper series. A from Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University

Abstract: We consider a two-stage voluntary provision model where individuals in a family contribute to inter-family public goods, and, at the same time, the parent makes private transfers to her child within the same family. We show not only that Warr’s neutrality holds regardless of the different timings of parent-to-child transfers, but also that there is a continuum of Nash equilibria in the sense that individuals’ contributions and parental transfers are indeterminate, although the allocation of each’s private consumption and total public good provision is uniquely determined. We further show that, in the presence of impure altruism, neutrality and uniqueness of the equilibrium allocation persist.

Keywords: private provision; public good; Nash equilibrium; subgame perfect equilibrium; family; C72; D64; H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2007-12-18
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/2115/30280 (text/html)
https://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2115/30280/1/DPA194.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Private provision of public goods between families (2012)
Working Paper: Private Provision of Public Goods between Families (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hok:dpaper:194

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion paper series. A from Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Hokkaido University Library ().