On the Private Provision of Contentious Public Characteristics

Richard Cornes and Dirk Rübbelke

ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics from Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics

Abstract: We extend the standard public good provision model to allow players to either like or dislike the public characteristic. Those who dislike it are able to take actions to reduce its level. We present conditions under which the existence of a unique noncooperative equilibrium is retained, and analyze its normative and comparative static properties.

JEL-codes: C72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 Pages
Date: 2012-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: On the Private Provision of Contentious Public Characteristics (2012)
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