On the Private Provision of Contentious Public Characteristics

Richard Cornes and Dirk Rübbelke

No 3881, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We extend the standard public good provision model to allow players to either like or dislike the public characteristic. Those who dislike it are able to take actions to reduce its level. We present conditions under which the existence of a unique noncooperative equilibrium is retained, and analyze its normative and comparative static properties.

Keywords: public goods; public bads; aggregative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: On the Private Provision of Contentious Public Characteristics (2012)
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