Potentially Harmful International Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision

Wolfgang Buchholz (), Richard Cornes and Dirk Rübbelke

ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics from Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics

Abstract: Recent international climate negotiations suggest that complete agreements are unlikely to materialize. Instead, partial cooperation between like-minded countries appears a more likely outcome. In this paper we analyze the effects of such partial cooperation between like-minded countries. In doing so, we link the literature on partial cooperation with so-called matching approaches. Matching schemes are regarded as providing a promising approach to overcome undersupply of public goods like climate protection. The functioning of matching mechanisms in a setting with an incomplete agreement, i.e. a contract where only a subset of the players participates, has however not been investigated yet. This paper fills this research gap by analyzing incomplete matching agreements in the context of international climate protection. We analyse their effect on both welfare and the global climate protection level. We show that matching coalitions may bring about a decline in global public good provision and a reduction in the welfare of outsiders.

JEL-codes: C78 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 Pages
Date: 2012-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-gth and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Potentially Harmful International Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision (2014)
Working Paper: Potentially Harmful International Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision (2012)
Working Paper: Potentially Harmful International Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2012-584

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