Potentially Harmful International Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision

Wolfgang Buchholz (), Richard Cornes and Dirk Rübbelke

No 3891, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Recent international climate negotiations suggest that complete agreements are unlikely to materialize. Instead, partial cooperation between like-minded countries appears a more likely outcome. In this paper we analyze the effects of such partial cooperation between like-minded countries. In doing so, we link the literature on partial cooperation with so-called matching approaches. Matching schemes are regarded as providing a promising approach to overcome undersupply of public goods like climate protection. The functioning of matching mechanisms in a setting with an incomplete agreement, i.e. a contract where only a subset of the players participates, has however not been investigated yet. This paper fills this research gap by analyzing incomplete matching agreements in the context of international climate protection. We analyse their effect on both welfare and the global climate protection level. We show that matching coalitions may bring about a decline in global public good provision and a reduction in the welfare of outsiders.

Keywords: coalition formation; public goods; matching; Pareto optimality; partial cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3891.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Potentially Harmful International Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision (2014)
Working Paper: Potentially Harmful International Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision (2012)
Working Paper: Potentially Harmful International Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3891

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().