EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Working Paper 277 - Deterrence and Legitimacy in Anti-Corruption Policymaking

Amadou Boly, Robert Gillanders () and Topi Miettinen ()

Working Paper Series from African Development Bank

Abstract: In our framed laboratory experiment, two Public Officials, A and B, make consecutive decisions regarding embezzlement from separate funds. Official B observes Official A’s decisions before making his/her own. We find a contagion effect in embezzlement in that facing a corrupt Official A increases the likelihood and extent of embezzlement by Official B. Likewise, deterrence matters in that higher detection probabilities significantly decrease the likelihood and extent of embezzlement. Crucially, when the same deterrence policy applies to both officials, detection is more effective in curbing embezzlement if chosen by an honest public official A rather than a corrupt Public Official A. This legitimacy effect may help explain why anti-corruption policies can fail in countries where the government itself is believed (or known) to be corrupt.

Date: 2017-08-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Docume ... n_Policymaking__.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adb:adbwps:2394

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from African Development Bank 15 Avenue du Ghana P.O.Box 323-1002 Tunis-Belvedère, Tunisia. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Adeleke Oluwole Salami ().

 
Page updated 2022-01-21
Handle: RePEc:adb:adbwps:2394