Working Paper 172 - Political Economy of Service Delivery: Monitoring versus Contestation
Kjell Hausken () and
Mthuli Ncube ()
Working Paper Series from African Development Bank
Many communities suffer limited public goods provision due to civil servants (doctors, teachers, etc) supplementing their low income with moonlighting activities. Monitors of civil servants commonly also earn low salaries from monitoring and may prefer political contestation for power and prestige. We determine an internal equilibrium for how monitors strike a balance between monitoring and political contestation. We also determine a corner solution where an unresourceful monitor does not monitor. A variety of characteristics including the intensity of political contestation are accounted for. Survey data from Tanzania and Senegal are used to show the significance of poor service delivery within education and healthcare services.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Docume ... s%20Contestation.pdf (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adb:adbwps:468
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Paper Series from African Development Bank 15 Avenue du Ghana P.O.Box 323-1002 Tunis-Belvedère, Tunisia. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Adeleke Oluwole Salami ().