Working Paper 173 - Production and Conflict in Risky Elections

Kjell Hausken and Mthuli Ncube ()

Working Paper Series from African Development Bank

Abstract: An incumbent allocates in period 1 of a two period game, a resource into production, fighting with the challenger, and producing public goods, which impact the probability of winning an election. In period 2 the incumbent may accept the election result, or a coalition or standoff may follow. We analyze the strategic choices. Econometric analysis of 653 African elections 1960-2010 shows that the incumbent wins with no contestation 64%, coalition 6%, and standoff 2%. The incumbent loses and accepts defeat 16%, coalition 12%, and standoff 0%. The impact of economic performance, education, political factors, natural resources, former-colonizer, etc, are scrutinized.

Date: 2013-06-14
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