Characterizing the Shapley Value in Fixed-Route Traveling Salesman Problems with Appointments

Duygu Yengin ()

No 2010-32, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: Starting from her home, a service provider visits several customers, following a predetermined route, and returns home after all customers are visited. The problem is to ?nd a fair allocation of the total cost of this tour among the customers served. A transferable-utility cooperative game can be associated with this cost allocation problem. We intro- duce a new class of games, which we refer as the fixed-route traveling salesman games with appointments. We characterize the Shapley Value in this class using a property which requires thttps://media.adelaide.edu.au/economics/litting into a set of sponsors.

Keywords: Fixed-route travelling salesman games; routing games; appointment games; the Shapley value; the core; transferable-utility games; merging and splitting proofness; networks; cost allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2010-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: The revised version of working paper #2009-28
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.economics.adelaide.edu.au/research/papers/doc/wp2010-32.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Characterizing the Shapley value in fixed-route traveling salesman problems with appointments (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:2010-32

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Qazi Haque ().