Characterizing the Shapley value in fixed-route traveling salesman problems with appointments

Duygu Yengin ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2012, vol. 41, issue 2, 299 pages

Keywords: Fixed-route traveling salesman games; Routing games; Appointment games; The Shapley value; The core; Transferable-utility games; Merging and splitting proofness; Networks; Cost allocation; C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-011-0285-7 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Characterizing the Shapley Value in Fixed-Route Traveling Salesman Problems with Appointments (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:2:p:271-299

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-011-0285-7

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().