Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative Vote Rule
Arnaud Dellis (),
Mandar Oak () and
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Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile: Universite Laval and CIRPEE
No 2015-06, School of Economics Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics
We use the citizen-candidate model to study electoral outcomes under the Alternative Vote rule, a voting method often proposed as a replacement to the prevalent Plurality rule. We show that, like the Plurality rule, the Alternative Vote rule deters multiple candidate clusters and the presence of candidates at more than two positions. Moreover, the Alternative Vote rule tends to support less policy polarization than the Plurality rule. These results stand in contrast to those obtained under other proposed voting rules, Approval Voting in particular, which are prone to candidate clustering and, as a result, can support greater policy polarization vis-Ãƒ -vis the Plurality rule.
Keywords: Alternative Vote rule; Instant Runoff Voting; Citizen-candidate model; Endogenous candidacy; policy polarization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 Pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:2015-06
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