Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule
Arnaud Dellis (),
Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile and
Mandar Oak ()
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2017, vol. 173, issue 4, 565-590
We use the citizen-candidate model to study electoral outcomes under the alternative-vote rule, a voting method often proposed as a replacement to the prevalent plurality rule. We show that, like the plurality rule, the alternative-vote rule deters multiple candidate clusters and the presence of candidates at more than two positions. Moreover, the alternative-vote rule tends to support less policy polarization than the plurality rule. These results stand in contrast to those obtained under other proposed voting rules, approval voting in particular, which are prone to candidate clustering and, as a result, can support greater policy polarization than the plurality rule.
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative Vote Rule (2015)
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