More Money vs More Certainty? Behaviour in Stochastic Alternating-Offer Experiments

Anna Conte, Werner Güth () and Paul Pezanis-Christou
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Werner Güth: Max Planck Institute for Collective Goods (Bonn) and LUISS (Rome)
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Güth ()

No 2017-06, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: We experimentally study behaviour in a class of stochastic alternating-offer bargaining games in which the final stage of interaction follows the rules of a (private) impunity game. We assess the symmetric dependence of proposers' and responders' behaviour to the stakes at play and to the likelihood of future play, and other behavioural conjectures related to bounded-rationality, conflict rates, probability misperception and emotional commitment. Besides a non-symmetric behaviour, our structural econometric analysis reveals a remarkable similarity of proposers' and responders' behaviour which is predominantly driven by probability misperceptions and emotional commitments.

Keywords: game theory; alternating-offer (ultimatum) bargaining; impunity; probability distortion; behavioural economics; simultaneous equation model. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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