Buchanan and the social contract: Coordination failures and the atrophy of property rights
Stefano Dughera and
Alain Marciano
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Stefano Dughera: University of Piemonte Orientale
No 24-03, Working Papers AFED from Association Francaise d'Economie du Droit (AFED)
Abstract:
James Buchanan advocated that societies should be based on a social contract. He rejected anarchy, seeing it as a “Hobbesian jungle” that calls for government intervention to maintain social order. He also opposed to theories of spontaneous order. These views led to debates about the compatibility of Buchanan’s works with classical liberalism, and even with democracy. This paper contributes to this discussion by exploring the development of Buchanan's views on anarchy from a historical viewpoint. We argue that Buchanan's earlier works contain a theory of spontaneous cooperation, and that Buchanan held to this theory until the 1970s. Then, the deteriorating conditions of American society got him convinced that albeit anarchy is theoretically desirable, cooperation requires individuals to enter a social contract and delegate enforcement authority to political institutions. Overall, the paper reconciles Buchanan's practical views with his philosophical inclinations, portraying him as a practical contractarian but a philosophical anarchist.
Keywords: Buchanan; social contract; government intervention; anarchy; spontaneous order (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B53 H11 P26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-hme, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Working Paper: Buchanan and the social contract:Coordination failures and the atrophy of property rights (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:afd:wpaper:2403
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