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Buchanan and the social contract:Coordination failures and the atrophy of property rights

Stefano Dughera () and Alain Marciano

Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers from University of Turin

Abstract: James Buchanan advocated that societies should be based on a social contract. He rejected anarchy, seeing it as a “Hobbesian jungle” that calls for government intervention to maintain social order. He also opposed to theories of spontaneous order. These views led to debates about the compatibility of Buchanan’s works with classical liberalism, and even with democracy. This paper contributes to this discussion by exploring the development of Buchanan's views on anarchy from a historical viewpoint. We argue that Buchanan's earlier works contain a theory of spontaneous cooperation, and that Buchanan held to this theory until the 1970s. Then, the deteriorating conditions of American society got him convinced that albeit anarchy is theoretically desirable, cooperation requires individuals to enter a social contract and delegate enforcement authority to political institutions. Overall, the paper reconciles Buchanan's practical views with his philosophical inclinations, portraying him as a practical contractarian but a philosophical anarchist.

Pages: pages 24
Date: 2024-03
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Working Paper: Buchanan and the social contract: Coordination failures and the atrophy of property rights (2024) Downloads
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