SHARE TENANCY, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, AND PREVENTED PLANTING CLAIMS IN CROP INSURANCE

Roderick Rejesus, Cesar Escalante (cescalan@uga.edu) and Ashley C. Lovell

No 22095, 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: A theoretical model based on opportunity cost and expected utility principles establishes linkages between the likelihood of prevented planting claims in crop insurance, existing share leasing arrangements and internal farm business structures. Results of probit estimation procedures indicate that simpler internal business structures and a more dominant farmer-tenant leasing position can increase the probability of submitting a prevented planting claim.

Keywords: Crop Production/Industries; Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2003
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/22095/files/sp03re01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Share Tenancy, Ownership Structure, and Prevented Planting Claims in Crop Insurance (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea03:22095

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.22095

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