Share Tenancy, Ownership Structure, and Prevented Planting Claims in Crop Insurance

Roderick Rejesus, Cesar Escalante () and Ashley C. Lovell

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2005, vol. 87, issue 1, 180-193

Abstract: A conceptual model based on opportunity cost and expected utility principles establishes linkages between the likelihood of prevented planting claims in crop insurance and existing share leasing arrangements/internal farm business structures. Results of heteroskedastic probit estimation procedures indicate that simpler internal business structures and more dominant farmer-tenant leasing position can increase the probability of submitting a prevented planting claim. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2005
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Working Paper: SHARE TENANCY, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, AND PREVENTED PLANTING CLAIMS IN CROP INSURANCE (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:87:y:2005:i:1:p:180-193

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