A Model of Endogenous Market Structure, Innovation, and Licensing in Agricultural Biotechnology

Benjamin Anderson and Ian Sheldon

No 61786, 2010 Annual Meeting, July 25-27, 2010, Denver, Colorado from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association

Abstract: We develop a model of endogenous market structure and sunk cost R&D investment that allows for the licensing of technology among competitors. Our theoretical model predicts both a greater lower bound to market concentration and higher levels of quality compared to the case without licensing. These result simply that in markets in which licensing and a symmetric R&D costs are prevalent, such as the agricultural biotechnology sector, the ability to license technology generates more concentration among firms but also improves consumer welfare by incentivizing the production of higher quality.

Keywords: Research; and; Development/Tech; Change/Emerging; Technologies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 1
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea10:61786

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.61786

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