The TRIPS Agreement as a Coercive Threat: Estimating the Effects of Trade Ties on IPR Enforcement

Ryan Cardwell and Pascal Ghazalian

No 145974, Trade Policy Briefs from Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy Research Network

Keywords: Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Demand and Price Analysis; International Development; International Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6
Date: 2012-12
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/145974/files/TPB%202012-06-Cardwell.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: The TRIPS Agreement as a Coercive Threat: Estimating the Effects of Trade Ties on IPR Enforcement (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:catptp:145974

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.145974

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