The TRIPS Agreement as a Coercive Threat: Estimating the Effects of Trade Ties on IPR Enforcement

Ryan Cardwell and Pascal Ghazalian

No 142376, Working Papers from Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy Research Network

Abstract: Negotiators from developed countries pushed hard for the inclusion of the TRIPS Agreement in the WTO set of agreements because it was viewed as a potentially effective method of coercing developing countries to strengthen their protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). We investigate whether the threat of cross-agreement retaliation, which could be authorized in disputes regarding the TRIPS Agreement, is effective in changing countries’ IPR protection regimes. The results from a panel empirical model suggest that both the TRIPS Agreement and the strength of trade ties with developed countries are important determinants of IPR protection, but that the vulnerability to potential trade losses through cross-agreement retaliation is not a uniformly significant determinant across geo-economic regions. We conclude that the threat of trade retaliation is just one important determinant of countries’ institutional protection of IPR.

Keywords: Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25
Date: 2012-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: The TRIPS Agreement as a Coercive Threat: Estimating the Effects of Trade Ties on IPR Enforcement (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:catpwp:142376

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.142376

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