Stable Partnerships, Matching, and Local Public Goods

Simon Clark and Ravi Kanbur

No 127325, Working Papers from Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management

Abstract: In the presence of local public goods differences in tastes are an important determinant of the way in which partnerships are formed. Heterogeneity in tastes for private vs. public goods produces a tendency to positive assortment and partnerships of couples with similar tastes; heterogeneity in tastes for different public goods brings about partnerships of couples with similar tastes only if there is a significant overlap in the distribution of tastes of the two groups to be matched. We show that with two public goods we may get negative assortment, pure positive assortment being only one of many possibilities.

Keywords: Community/Rural/Urban; Development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40
Date: 2002-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/127325/files/Cornell_Dyson_wp0232.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Stable partnerships, matching, and local public goods (2004)
Working Paper: Stable Partnerships, Matching, and Local Public Goods (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:cudawp:127325

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.127325

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().