Stable Partnerships, Matching, and Local Public Goods

Simon Clark and Ravi Kanbur

Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: In the presence of local public goods differences in tastes are an important determinant of the way in which partnerships are formed. Heterogeneity in tastes for private vs. public goods produces a tendency to positive assortment and partnerships of couples with similar tastes; heterogeneity in tastes for different public goods brings about partnerships of couples with similar tastes only if there is a significant overlap in the distribution of tastes of the two groups to be matched. We show that with two public goods we may get negative assortment, pure positive assortment being only one of many possibilities.

Keywords: matching; sorting; local public goods; heterogeneity of tastes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D13 D61 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37
Date: 2002-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Stable partnerships, matching, and local public goods (2004)
Working Paper: Stable Partnerships, Matching, and Local Public Goods (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:82

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