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Contracting for Environmental Property Rights: The Case of Vittel

Christophe Depres, Gilles Grolleau () and Naoufel Mzoughi

No 24729, 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark from European Association of Agricultural Economists

Abstract: Based on an authentic case of contracting for environmental property rights, our paper shows several implications of applying the Coase's propositions. The case study adds empirical content to basic transaction costs concepts by analyzing the design and implementation of a contractual arrangement between a pollutee a bottler of mineral water Vittel and several polluting farmers. We analyze the bargaining between land and water rights owners and the bottler Vittel to determine how transaction cost issues (valuation disputes, bi-lateral monopoly conditions, and third-party effects) were overcome and how they succeeded in contracting for environmental property rights. We provide several comparisons of the Vittel case with other similar cases, leading to generalizations and testable propositions for environmental rights negotiations.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Contracting for Environmental Property Rights: The Case of Vittel (2008) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eaae05:24729

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.24729

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