ON THE PERSISTENCE OF INEFFICIENT NORMS

Sanjeev Goyal and Maarten Janssen

No 272485, Econometric Institute Archives from Erasmus University Rotterdam

Abstract: This paper considers an infinite stage two person coordination game in which players are asymmetrically informed about the changes in the stage-game pay-offs. The main result is that, in all equilibria, if players start by conforming to a stage-game norm then, inspite of the existence of signalling possibilities, the informed player chooses not to signal an interval of strict pareto-improving changes in stage-game pay-offs, ,and this leads to the persistence of norms, which have become in-efficient.

Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 1992-03-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eureia:272485

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.272485

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