ON THE PERSISTENCE OF INEFFICIENT NORMS
Sanjeev Goyal and
No 272485, Econometric Institute Archives from Erasmus University Rotterdam
This paper considers an infinite stage two person coordination game in which players are asymmetrically informed about the changes in the stage-game pay-offs. The main result is that, in all equilibria, if players start by conforming to a stage-game norm then, inspite of the existence of signalling possibilities, the informed player chooses not to signal an interval of strict pareto-improving changes in stage-game pay-offs, ,and this leads to the persistence of norms, which have become in-efficient.
Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eureia:272485
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Econometric Institute Archives from Erasmus University Rotterdam Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().