River Sharing and Water Trade

Erik Ansink, Michael Gengenbach and Hans-Peter Weikard

No 122860, Climate Change and Sustainable Development from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2012-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/122860/files/NDL2012-017.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: River Sharing and Water Trade (2015)
Working Paper: River Sharing and Water Trade (2013)
Working Paper: River Sharing and Water Trade (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemcl:122860

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.122860

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Climate Change and Sustainable Development from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().