River Sharing and Water Trade

Hans-Peter Weikard, Erik Ansink and Michael Gengenbach

VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be su cient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory.

JEL-codes: C79 D71 P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/79931/1/VfS_2013_pid_169.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: River Sharing and Water Trade (2015)
Working Paper: River Sharing and Water Trade (2012)
Working Paper: River Sharing and Water Trade (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79931

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